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Post-Quantum Readiness

Every asset in the Cryptographic Asset Inventory carries a post-quantum readiness verdict: whether the cryptography it stands for withstands a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The verdict is decided by a fixed set of rules that ships with the platform and cannot be configured, and each verdict records the rule that decided it and the reason.

Verdicts​

VerdictDescriptionExamples
PQC readyThe asset withstands a cryptographically relevant quantum computerAES-256, SHA-384, ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65, X25519-ML-KEM-768
Not PQC readyThe asset needs replacing: a quantum computer breaks it, it is broken already, its size is too small, or its post-quantum scheme has no finished standardRSA-4096, ECDSA-P-256, AES-128, MD5, Kyber768
Not applicablePost-quantum migration does not apply to the assetA salt, a password or a token; a name that is not an algorithm, such as OpenSSL; a cipher-suite name
UnknownThe rules cannot decide from what the CBOMs recordAES without a size, HMAC without its hash, a certificate that records no signature algorithm

How a verdict is decided​

The rules read what the CBOMs record for the asset: its type and name, its algorithm family, primitive, parameter set, elliptic curve and variant, and for key material its type and size. Every rule for the asset's type is evaluated, and of the rules that apply, one decides:

  1. A rule that puts the asset outside the question decides first: material that is not a key, or a name that is a cipher suite or not an algorithm at all. A salt named after DES is therefore Not applicable.
  2. Otherwise the weakest finding decides, Not PQC ready before Unknown before PQC ready. X25519-ML-KEM-768-MD5 is Not PQC ready because of MD5, although its ML-KEM part is ready.

The rules follow these principles:

  • Factoring and discrete logarithms. RSA, DSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ECDH and the other schemes a quantum computer breaks are Not PQC ready at any size: RSA-4096 is as Not PQC ready as RSA-2048.
  • Classically broken algorithms. DES, 3DES, RC4, MD5 and SHA-1 are Not PQC ready, also as a component of another name, such as HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1.
  • Symmetric and hash-based algorithms. A quantum computer weakens AES, ChaCha20, SHA-2 or SHA-3 but does not break them. They are PQC ready when their recorded key or digest size reaches 256 bits, the AES key size CNSA 2.0 requires: AES-256, SHA-256 and SHA-384 are ready, while AES-128, AES-192 and SHA-224 are Not PQC ready. Without a size, a family that also defines smaller sizes is Unknown, as AES is, and so is a size the family does not define, such as AES-64.
  • Constructions. HMAC, CMAC, HKDF, PBKDF2 and similar constructions are as strong as the primitive they are built on: HMAC-SHA256 is ready, a bare HMAC is Unknown.
  • Keys. A secret key, symmetric key or shared secret is held to 256 bits as well, and is Unknown without a usable size, unless its name decides it: a DES key is Not PQC ready whatever its size. Other keys take the verdict of the family their name carries, so an RSA-2048 private key is Not PQC ready.
  • Post-quantum schemes. The standardized schemes ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), LMS and XMSS (SP 800-208) are PQC ready, and a parameter set they do not define, such as ML-KEM-1000, is Unknown. Drafts and candidates without a finished standard, such as Kyber, Dilithium or Falcon, are Not PQC ready, and so are schemes broken by cryptanalysis, such as SIKE.
  • Hybrids. A hybrid takes the verdict of its post-quantum part: X25519-ML-KEM-768 is ready, X25519-Kyber768 is not. A name that offers schemes as alternatives, such as RSA-2048 or ML-DSA-65, is not a hybrid and is Not PQC ready, because the RSA part may be used alone.
  • Certificates. A certificate is as ready as the weaker of the key it certifies and the algorithm it is signed with. A certificate that records no signature algorithm is Unknown, even with a ready key.
  • Protocols. A protocol is as ready as the weakest algorithm its cipher suites name, and it is PQC ready only when one of them establishes a key, as a key agreement or a KEM does. A TLS 1.3 cipher suite names only its cipher and hash, so a TLS 1.3 protocol whose suites name nothing else is Unknown.

A certificate or a protocol takes its verdict from the assets it refers to in the inventory, and its verdict names the asset it was taken from. A referenced asset that is not in the inventory, never evaluated or Not applicable makes the verdict Unknown, unless another reference is Not PQC ready. The mode, the padding and a NIST quantum security level the CBOM declares are shown among the evaluated properties, but they never decide a verdict.

When a verdict is Unknown​

An Unknown verdict usually means that the CBOMs do not record what the rules need, such as the size of a key or a symmetric algorithm, the primitive of a construction, the signature algorithm of a certificate or the key exchange of a protocol. The reason of the verdict says what is missing, so that the producer of the CBOM can record it.

An asset that has never been evaluated is listed as Unknown too, and so is an asset the rules could not be evaluated for at all, with the rule EVALUATION-FAILED. The asset detail tells these cases apart.

Re-evaluation​

Synchronization evaluates the assets that a CBOM adds to the inventory or changes. The scheduled job CryptoAssetPqcSweepTask, a system job of the Scheduler, runs every hour at half past and re-evaluates the verdicts that are out of date. A verdict is out of date when it was never taken, or when something it was decided from has changed since: the recorded properties of the asset, the verdict of an asset it refers to, or the rules, after an upgrade that changes them. A verdict can therefore change without a new CBOM of its own, for example when the key a certificate certifies changes its verdict. Each run re-evaluates a limited number of assets, so a large backlog, such as the one after an upgrade that changes the rules, is worked off over several runs.

While the job is disabled, synchronization still evaluates the assets it adds or changes, but no other verdict is brought up to date. If verdicts stay out of date, check in the Scheduler that the job is enabled and why it last skipped a run. A single asset cannot be re-evaluated on demand.

Reading the explanation​

The explanation of a verdict, on the asset detail or through the API, evaluates the asset again from what is stored and changes nothing. It says whether the result matches the stored verdict, or whether the stored verdict is out of date or missing, in which case the next re-evaluation stores the result. It lists every rule for the asset's type with its outcome:

OutcomeDescription
DecidedThe rule's condition held and its verdict is the asset's
ResolvedThe rule's condition held and the verdict is taken from another inventory asset the asset refers to
MatchedThe rule's condition held, but a rule ranked ahead of it decided
Not matchedThe rule's condition did not hold for the asset
FailedThe rules could not be evaluated for the asset, so no rule decided; this is then the only step

Each step shows the properties its rule read. A property taken from a CBOM the viewer may not read is not shown, although the rules still read it.